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6733 - Inequality effects of fiscal federal bargaining in Argentina and Brazil.

Taking the economic foundations of statehood in Latin America seriously, this paper focus on the bargaining processes between centre and periphery within the fiscal federalism of Argentina and Brazil. Bargaining processes around the rules of fiscal federalism constitute a condensational point where global entanglements meet endogenous bargaining processes on state building. On the one hand the export orientation of most Latin American countries interconnects particular territories in the nation state with the world economy differently, leading to a questioning of redistributive fiscal structure by subnational entities. On the other hand, the struggle for authority and the capacity to tax export-driven revenues are crucial for the bargaining processes around fiscal federalism. This paper compares the ability of the central government to centralize export driven revenues. Although the ability to centralize such revenues leads to a greater dominance of territorial networks and a structuring of political topographies in the fiscal federalism bargaining process, it has little to do with the creation of an effective fiscal system, which should solve problems regional and social inequalities.

Palavras-chaves: Inequalities, Fiscal Federalism, Global entanglements, Brazil, Argentina

Autores: Constantin, Groll (Universidad Libre, Berlín, Germany / Deutschland)

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